Misplaced Pressure
National security must strengthen, not close, Japan Inc.
By Jesper Koll
The government of newly elected Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida deserves to be congratulated for having elevated national security to a top priority by establishing the new position of economic security minister, filled by former Ministry of Finance bureaucrat Takayuki Kobayashi. Global investors and business leaders will certainly welcome the creation of a “control tower” to coordinate, focus, and, hopefully, streamline the increasingly complex trade and investment rules and directives now governing global engagement with Japan Inc.
Unfortunately, there is significant risk in this undertaking. More bureaucracy can easily backfire. Instead of streamlining and centralizing procedures, there is a great danger of duplication and increased bureaucratic red tape, given the vested interests and institutional pride of the incumbent ministries.
Kishida’s new ministry could end up making it more difficult and cumbersome for global investors to buy Japanese companies and trade with Japanese suppliers. In the name of national security, the new Ministry of Economic Security could actually bring on a new trend of insularity and ossification in corporate Japan.
Path to Security
Of course, it is easy to understand the reason Japanese leaders feel pressured to follow the lead of the United States in seeking to raise bureaucratic and political oversight over global investment flows.
However, the fact that all this happens in the name of supposedly protecting national security is, in my view, the real red flag. Why? Because the best way to ensure economic security is to ensure that your nation’s corporate sector is strong, innovative, and globally competitive.
If corporate Japan is to have a bright future, it certainly needs more active debate with the stewards of global finance. And yes, sometimes the investors’ threats to challenge board members and existing corporate structures are absolutely key to the mid- and long-term competitiveness and sustainability of all stakeholders.
In fact, the empirical reality of Japan’s market verifies this point with great clarity. Almost all successful corporate turnarounds in past decades originated in either substantial foreign direct investment (FDI) or global investors’ lobbying for change. Nissan, Sharp, Sony, Fanuc, and Shiseido are just some of the highlights.
Make no mistake: for global relevance and future competitiveness, the more interaction with global investors, the better it will be for Japan’s national competitiveness and, thus, her national security.
Poison Pill?
Leveraging global investor knowledge and insight is an existential imperative for Japan. For all the talk about self-sufficiency, let us remember that slightly more than 60 percent of listed companies’ profits come from global sales. From here, Japan’s domestic economy probably will see lower growth than other global markets, so the need for more global and open perspectives—as well as challenges to the status quo—are poised to grow in importance.
Unfortunately, some Japanese leaders appear ready to use the powers of the new ministry to shut out global challengers and justify business as usual behind the excuse of national security.
Clear speak: Kobayashi could easily find himself leading a “poison pill” ministry, preventing necessary renewal and innovation. Domestic corporate leaders will get busy and, in the name of national security, lobby the new ministry for protection. The new ministry could easily become a creeping liability for the future dynamism and global competitiveness of corporate Japan. Clearly, corporate ossification and a retreat from globalization cannot be in Japan’s national interest.
Specifically, new and tighter rules are poised to, in effect, shut out Japanese companies from the forces of the global competition for risk capital. Under the mantle of national security, this could also feed complacency and stagnation. Already, Japanese conglomerates have fallen behind in many new leading-edge areas, such as cybersecurity, quantum computing, and drone technology.
What Japan really needs are more active and engaged domestic investors and fund managers who aren’t afraid to engage and challenge senior corporate leaders.
Whether we like it or not, global finance is the most efficient and effective tool to force senior management to stay on top of their game. Therefore, there is a great risk that the new rules will merely protect already outdated technologies, feeding a new breed of so-called zombie companies in Japan. This is particularly true since, unlike the United States, where the move toward tighter restrictions began, Japanese companies no longer have a natural competitive strength in cutting-edge technology.
FDI
What about global investors? Technically, tightening national security supervision will raise both the cost of investing here as well as the risks. Internal compliance and controls will have to be tightened to ensure that new potential criminal liabilities are minimized.
Here, transparency is key. Right now, we know that rules will be tightened, but we don’t know how and where, nor on what basis. Kishida would be well advised to be more proactive and engage with foreign investors and business leaders on how to best balance national security with technology transfer, innovation, and transformation.
However, no matter how smooth the procedures may become, the net result is a higher compliance–cost base for investing in Japan. For large, established players, this should not be a problem. But smaller startups that are trying to explore opportunities in the Japanese market are poised to suffer disproportionately from the higher compliance and legal costs resulting from new rules. Tokyo’s reputation as the global finance-compliance center will grow.
From a Japan equity strategist’s perspective, much of the bull case for Japan depends on unlocking the deep value offered by Japanese businesses that is well documented in the historically low valuation metrics and high cash balances of listed companies.
We need a catalyst to unlock this value. Unfortunately, making it more difficult for non-Japanese to buy into and trade with Japan does not make it easier for Japanese to buy into Japan.
Real Needs
To truly strengthen security, the government should step up public incentives for technology companies to:
Stretch and sweat their engineers harder by exposing them to more, not less, global exchange and interaction
Raise R&D spending for university and corporate researchers
Stimulate commercialization of new technologies deemed to be in the national interest by offering tax breaks to researchers, to startup entrepreneurs, and for in-house development
Protection is typically backward-looking, and what Japan needs is forward-looking incentives to unlock next-generation innovation and commercialization. To get there, Japan requires more, not less, pressure from global financial investors.
What Japan really needs are more active and engaged domestic investors and fund managers who aren’t afraid to engage and challenge senior corporate leaders. Policies designed to help domestic asset owners unlock corporate value are not just welcome, but essential to allowing a new catalyst for corporate revival.
This is where policy action is needed, to promote Japan for the Japanese. National security is based on homegrown strength and policies to unlock domestic aspirations, not on restricting global capital from becoming partners in this process.
Jesper Koll
Global ambassador
Monex Group Inc.
THE ACCJ JOURNAL
Vol. 58 Issue 8
A flagship publication of The American Chamber of Commerce in Japan (ACCJ), The ACCJ Journal is a business magazine with a 58-year history.
Christopher Bryan Jones,
Publisher and editor-in-chief
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